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Abstract 
This paper reviews Friedrich Hayek’s conceptualization of social justice. It explores the basic tenets of the concept 
and probes into some of the assumptions of the concept. In the process, the article  highlights the issues raised with 
a view to use the examination of the concepts as a basis for discussion on the probity and relevance of the 
assumptions for developing nations. 
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1.Introduction 
In Hayek's conceptualization, the word `justice' refers to general rules of conduct between people. Men, driven by 
their rational faculty, move away from what Hobbes would call the `state of nature' to one where they have learned 
to coordinate the pursuit of their private goals within a context of universal abstract rules. Such rules represent the 
experience of the past handed down to the present. Hayek has chosen the term `rules of just conduct' to describe 
"those end-independent rules which serve the formation of a spontaneous order, in contrast to the end-dependent 
rules of organization." (Hayek, 1976: 31)  These `rules of justice' help us to be reasonably confident about what 
others will or will not do. Only human conduct can, therefore be called just or unjust.  
To speak of justice, argues Hayek, is to presuppose the recognition of rules which define a set 
circumstances wherein a certain kind of conduct is prohibited or required. Such rules distinguish between 
different kinds of conduct which people recognize explicitly as just or unjust. Any attempt to apply the term to a 
state of affairs raises problems because "a state of affairs which nobody can change, may be good or bad, but not 
just or unjust" (Ibid, 1976: 31) Since Hayek's ideal society order is not a product of human design, the particulars 
of such an order cannot be called just or unjust. Justice is viewed as a moral concept and only human deeds can 
be called moral or immoral, just or unjust. 
This paper reviews Hayek's arguments on social justice. The paper further seeks to probe into some of 
the assumptions in the hope that the issues raised could be used as basis for future further discussion on the 
probity and relevance of the assumptions. 
 
2. Social Justice  
Social justice, sometimes referred to as distributive justice, is used to imply that some form of a more equal 
distribution of income or wealth between the various members of society is fairer and more just. Advocates of the 
social justice principle are of the view that to redress economic disparities, the state should be empowered to 
intervene and redistribute the income `pie' in favour of the less wealthy. This involves, as Lane correctly points out, 
taking something away from someone in order to give it someone else (Lane, 1986). 
Hayek’s critique of social justice has been cogently summarized by Edward Feser who simplifies 
Hayek’s views on social justice as follows: 
First, Hayek says that justice and injustice can only be attributes of the deliberate actions of individual 
human beings, and not of states of affairs; in particular, that a distribution of wealth fits a certain pattern is not 
the sort of thing that can of itself be either just or unjust.  Second, he argues that since there can be no rules of 
individual action the following of which would guarantee that the distribution of wealth comes out a certain way, 
the notion of social justice would be unrealizable even if it were coherent.  Third, he holds that given the absence 
of such rules of action, and given also the wide disagreement that is bound to exist in a pluralistic modern society 
over what criteria ought to determine how economic rewards get distributed, there is no principled way in which 
any ideal of social justice, even if it were coherent, could be implemented consistently with the rule of law, so 
that the push for social justice threatens us with totalitarianism. ( Edward Feser, 2005)  
Redistribution of wealth, insists Hayek would imply that people should not be treated equally and this is 
contrary to the principles of equal application of the rules of conduct. In a market system, only a mixture of 
individuals' skills and luck determine where they will be placed on the ladder of income and wealth. One's 
relative position is not the result of anyone's deliberate action, but the outcome of a process over which nobody 
has any control. Justice has " no application to the manner in which the impersonal process of the market 
allocates command over goods and services to particular people." (Hayek, 1976: 71) It is therefore mistaken to 
use the word `injustice' because nobody has acted unjustly. In other words, how can we justify taking something 
away from an individual who has done nothing to deserve the punishment inflicted on him?  One cannot answer 
the question of who has been unjust.  
On the opinion held by liberal reformers that a more equal treatment of society  is desirable to a more 
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unequal one, Hayek asserts that people differ in intelligence, skill, resourcefulness, perseverance, etc, as well as in 
their social circumstances and physical surroundings. Once government takes upon itself that task of redistributing 
incomes on the basis of some `merit'  (which must be arbitrary itself), it will be faced with competing demands by 
different groups and individuals. Because there are no agreed rules which decide who should get what, the 
decisions of the government will be arbitrary. "Once politics becomes a tug-of -war for shares in the income pie, 
decent government is impossible" (Ibid :150).  Income redistribution is branded as tyrannical, with a "majority of  
takers who decide what they will take from a wealthier minority (Hayek, 1960).  He adds that the very idea of 
income redistribution cannot be defended on grounds of justice.  (Hayek, 1976) 
Hayek also notes that progress is impossible unless there are people with means, who can experiment with 
new ways of living, whether in terms of material comforts or in intangibles. If people today are able to enjoy 
owning a car, a refrigerator, a radio or take an air trip at modest cost, it is only because these things were put on the 
market as undreamed-of luxuries for all, but a few (Hayek, 1976). Many of the improvements we take for granted 
would never have been possible without this process of experimentation.   
We wish to point out that Hayek is putting a lot of faith in the taste of the rich and the market. Is it not 
possible that the wealthy elite could steer the market toward expensive commodities at the expense of more useful 
ones that cater for the majority basic needs?  
 
3. Concluding remarks 
Hayek sees the increasing strength of the demand for social justice as one of the major causes of dirigisme and the 
rise of welfare state measures. To him, these tendencies are incompatible with the rule of law and liberty. The 
government in a free society has no business trying to determine the material position of particular people or 
enforce distributive or `social justice. Social inequality is incompatible with liberty.  Social inequality is not unjust 
if it is a by-product of a free society. Hayek appears to be saying social inequality is good for you, even if you 
happen to be poor! (Bay, 1971: 99).  Any attempts by government to promote egalitarian aims reduces liberty in the 
Hayekian free market order.     
To Hayek, the repeated calls for social justice based on redistribution of income is largely a yearning to 
a return to the comfortable instinctive world of the hunters and gatherers. He argues that it was the abandonment 
of this old morality which made the society based on market processes possible. Hayek is emphatic that there is 
no way in which general rules of economic behaviour can be combined with a predetermined distribution of 
income or wealth. 
Certain questions need to be asked and perhaps addressed if this discussion is to be taken seriously. 
Could it be that Hayek's is sincerely unaware that he might be speaking for a particular class interest? Could it 
also be that Hayek's argument for an unfettered free market that should not concern itself with the redistribution 
of wealth has been overtaken by events?   
Much as the learned professor may seek to dissociate himself from conservatism , his book The Road to 
Serfdom made him a hero among American conservatives. In 1964, a compilation entitled What is Conservatism? 
included Hayek among the twelve leading conservative thinkers with his paper, `Why I Am Not A 
Conservative," as his contribution.  (Bay 1971: 97) 
It can be argued that Hayek would not care about those in the developing world who live in abject 
poverty in a world dominated by Western military and economic might. Human nature being what it is, writes  
Hayek, " we cannot feel (genuine concern) about the thousands or millions of unfortunates whom we know to 
exist in the world but whose individual circumstances we do not know"  (Hayek,  1976: 116). " Our task," he 
urges, "must be to continue to lead, to move ahead along the path which so many more are trying to tread in our 
wake... even a small decline in our rate of advance might be fatal to us." (Ibid :116).  He probably assumes that 
the benefits of American and West European progress would simply trickle down to developing nations as well. 
If present indicators are anything to go by, developing countries are in for a long wait. 
We will use the example of Africa’s development struggle to highlight our point. According to the 
Hayekian perspectives rooted in modernisation theory, if Africa is to `take off', it must evolve into a modern society 
that encourages a free market characterized by an entrepreneurial and competitive industrial market that should not 
concern itself with the redistribution of wealth issues.  
The major anomaly of that paradigm is that it portrays development as an evolutionary movement towards 
the `standards' of the developed countries. It fails to realize that the experience of the West cannot be universally 
applied to all countries. Even if all societies were to evolve on the Western lines, what would happen when some 
societies tampered with the natural evolution of others? The modernists failed to realize that African countries had 
been prevented from evolving their own systems by colonialism. As Colin Leys argues, the `backwardness' of 
Africa was not an original backwardness that had once been universal. It was a `new form of backwardness, the 
product of colonialism.' (Leys in Doro & Stulz , 1986: 169) 
The Western countries developed at a time when the world was scientifically and technologically 
undeveloped. They did not have to confront the challenge of a `more developed' world than themselves (Ahmad, 
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1989). Such an environment enabled them to  develop their economic and political structures at their own pace. 
Needless to say, that pace was slow and painful. There must therefore be other processes by which one can 
achieve that `modernization' since the historical circumstances of Africa and Western countries are markedly 
different.  
African states also faced some extraordinary pressures as they struggled for viability. When they 
attained their independence, their economies were very weak. Their inherited economies were closely tied to the 
former colonial powers and were geared towards the production of raw materials. The multinational corporations 
(MNCS) dominated the economic activities of various countries. The MNCs were more preoccupied with the 
export of commodities and profits than to the employment needs of the country's poor. The small indigenous 
bourgeoisie lacked the expertise and experience to manage their own productive enterprises. The rural 
population was so close to the margin of survival that mobilization of a high volume of domestic savings was 
virtually impossible.  
Unlike the Western countries that received massive injections of capital to rebuild their economies 
under the Marshall plan, the African countries had hardly begun their own industrial revolution when they were 
forced to hurtle towards the high-tech world of the twenty-first century. (Whitaker, 1988). At independence, 
most countries had to start laying foundations upon which a market economy could thrive. Whereas the post-war 
Western countries were rebuilding economies that had been in existence before the war, African countries were 
basically struggling to lay the basis for viable economies.   
These empirical failings of modernization theory prescriptions have led to the loss of confidence in its 
validity. Those who dare to look into the future see a world of diminishing resources. At the same time they are 
increasingly concerned about the effects that economic growth has on the environment. Hayek needs to be 
reminded that the limitations of macro-economic indicators as measures of progress lead many to shift their 
attention to issues that address sustainable development from a holistic perspective. 
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